discordant. Instead, it echoes the much more critical review of 2005 -07 (cf. Buhlunga et al. 2007 in the works that are cited.
This review essay covers only a few selected topics. It does not pretend to be comprehensive, or even completely up-to-date, but it does present an interpretation of democracy in South Africa that is historically situated and touches on key areas of concern, such as the unfinished business of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the slow progress on land restitution, the political ineptitude around HIV/AIDS, and the growing economic inequality among the populace, thus widening the class divide in society. It reflects some of the critical engagement among intellectuals and policy-makers on core democratic principles, by drawing on a slew of publications that have appeared mainly under the imprint of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), which has established a reputation for providing 'expert' opinion on contemporary political economy.
The survey also aims, in a more modest way, to deal with some of the spectres of the apartheid past. As Deborah Posel and Achille Mbembe (2004) have observed in their construction of a 'politics of hope', South Africa's democratic constitution has itself tried to undo 'the legacies of oppression and racial inequality' and various new memorializations have attempted to empower the 'previously disadvantaged', along with the TRC. Though none of these is without flaws, they represent crucial initiatives for stable and peaceful solutions in a global arena of violent conflict. They 'each entail practices of historical acknowledgement' without which 'it is surely impossible to transcend a politics of denial, and linked to that, a politics of resentment and perpetual victimhood' (Posel and Mbembe 2004, p. 12) .
In the authorized biography of Desmond Tutu, John Allen quotes the Archbishop Emeritus's 'biblical' assessment of South Africa's democratic change:
We have all left the house of apartheid's bondage. Some, an elite few, have actually crossed the Jordan into the promised land. Others, too many, still wallow in the wilderness of degrading, dehumanizing poverty ... Much has been done. People have clean water and electricity who never had these before but we are sitting on a powder keg because the gap between rich and poor is widening and some of the very rich are now black. (Allen 2006, p. 392) Tutu has consistently advocated a 'politics of hope', from his days as critic of apartheid to his triumphalism in 1994. More and more he has become the conscience of majoritarian government. His recent controversial role is well-documented in attacks on government spending on armaments; its policies on Zimbabwe; Thabo Mbeki's reluctance to tackle the scourge of HIV/AIDS; and the political arrogance of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). His moral authority and international stature give weight to his judgements and credence to his perceived political 'independence' in elite circles. That he is abused by the ANC Youth League simply endorses his moderate image, which to some casts him as heir to Mandela's reconciliation politics, but without party backing.
The shift to a more critical view of South Africa's democracy is itself a product of the changed political environment which permits freedom of expression. As Richard Calland (2006, p. 7) observes, '[in] governance terms, South Africa is unrecognizable from ten years ago'. He sees 1994-96 as the 'golden age' for parliament as it stripped apartheid of its power and devised a first-class modern constitution. He regards the Constitutional Court as the 'ultimate repository of both legal and political power' and shows its capacity to check the unconstitutional behaviour of the executive (Calland 2006, pp. 221-42) . Ultimately, however, power lies with the president, in Calland's view (Calland 2006, pp. 15-41) . He therefore pays particular attention to Mbeki and the bureaucracy of the ANC in government. He argues that the president's office has dwarfed parliament, ironically because of the unbridled strength of the ANC, which has meant that debate takes place within party structures rather than in the house. Calland (2006, pp. 115-32) tries to demystify the ANC by looking briefly at its organization, history and traditions, but his main contribution is to distinguish the ANC in government from the ANC as a party.
The ANC is more than simply a political party, it is also the fulcrum of an alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which raises the question of their respective influence -perhaps a 'fatal attraction', Calland imputes in the subtitle of chapter 6 of Anatomy of South Africa (2006). He pronounces that: 'As a general rule, their value diminishes when the ANC is feeling strong and confident' (Calland 2006, p. 11) . In the background are the media, the official opposition and civil society. But significantly, in his conclusion, he gives prominence to business interests and the 'New Establishment', which he portrays as being in a 'congealing embrace' with politics (Calland 2006, pp. 261-279) . Although he discusses the shift in presidential styles from Mandela to Mbeki, the detail is left to Tom Lodge, whose Bus Stop for Everyone (2002) has not been properly appreciated for its deeper analysis.
Lodge suggestively examines the politics of succession within the ANC between 1997 and 1999, showing that Mbeki's position as deputy president in the first ANC government did not guarantee an easy transfer of power as he had to contend with rivals and strong personalities in the cabinet, such as Mac Maharaj, Dullah Omar and Tito Mboweni (Lodge 2002, p. 245) . There were open clashes with Mbeki over a range of issues, including the issue of secrecy in the hearings of the TRC. The succession debate is once again central to South Africa's democracy in 2007; it permeates all political contestation following the Jacob Zuma trial, and is much more fraught than Mbeki's campaign to take the reins from Mandela. (The Polokwane wave has already begun to flow through the structures of the ruling party and Mbeki's second term as president is prematurely over).
Mandela's aim was national unity and racial reconciliation, while Mbeki has focused on creating a modern democracy, conceptualized as a 'developmental state'. Roger Southall (2007a, p. 3) argues that this modernization began as early as 1995 and has led to the centralization of power, mainly the result of the role of the policy unit headed by Joel Netshitenzhe and its labyrinthine directorates. He agrees with Calland that presidential power depended on the restructuring of the public service (Southall 2007a , p. 4, Calland 2006 . The construction of a modern state is credited with the consolidation of political legitimacy, economic growth and the delivery of social benefits. But it has been very uneven. Southall attributes this to the ANC's obsession with 'representivity' rather than efficiency in government. Affirmative action and black empowerment are brought into central focus and he declares that:
the ANC opted for a short-term strategy of middle-class replacement through on-thejob affirmative action rather than choosing to invest in human capacity over the long term. The outcome has been a low level of administrative performance and the extensive abuse of their powers and positions by many self-serving public servants. (Southall 2007a, p. 8) Southall goes on to examine the 'systematization of corruption' and 'the reluctance to investigate allegations that state positions and resources have been misused to the ANC's advantage' (Southall 2007a, pp. 8-9) . Poor service delivery and the 'dysfunctionality' of local government further tarnish the ANC government's record. But his major criticism of the ANC is its failure to face up to the succession struggle (Southall 2007a, pp. 14-19) . Anthony Butler (2007, p. 47) agrees that the battle for the presidency has exposed differences 'over economic policy, race and ethnicity, and the nature of political freedom' within the ruling party, and thus limits its democratic achievements since 1994. He points to the stark divisions within the Alliance as a threat to the neo-liberal policies of Mbeki's administration, but equally to the offence that many trade unionists felt at Zuma's rape trial. The split in the ANC extends from its branches to its National Executive Committee (NEC) and Zuma's support has been massive in KwaZulu-Natal. He has also encouraged ethnic mobilization through a dramatic demonstration of chiefly modes of exercising power. Butler (2007, p. 48 ) identifies generational and class divisions, and he could equally have emphasized the gender divide among the dilemmas facing future ANC leadership.
The centrality of the state is a cornerstone of South Africa's democracy. Its role as the architect of change, even in a 'free-market' economy, challenges neo-liberal versions of globalization. As Posel and Mbembe (2004, p. 13 ) point out, 'in a stable democracy which valorises the law, it must be the state -disciplined by the lawwhich regulates decisions'. Around the world, however, many states have surrendered this monopoly, often with disastrous consequences. The powerful state also has to deal with the global trend towards weakening national borders from an economic point of view particularly, thus precipitating a contradiction as it strongly defends its boundaries to exclude strangers and migrants whose increasing mobility is sponsored by the 'new configurations of global markets'. Cosmopolitanism and citizenship therefore compete in South Africa's democracy, sometimes leading to new forms of discrimination and segregation (Nyamnjoh 2006) .
In reviewing the relationship between trade unions and democracy, Southall, Edward Webster and Sakhela Buhlungu (2006, pp. 219-26) are compelled to write an 'afterword' to their anthology, thus acknowledging a need to re-write the version presented in the body of the book. In many ways this is the product of the dramatic political developments after 2004 which renders most analyses partial, if not obsolete, very quickly. They declare that the ANC has been 'plunged into one of the worst crises of its history' (Southall et al. 2006, p. 219) , following the conviction by the High Court of Shabir Shaik in June 2005. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) brought preliminary charges against Zuma on the grounds of a perceived corrupt relationship with Shaik, and in November 2005 he was also charged with rape. The political repercussions reverberated throughout the country and reached beyond its borders. They profoundly affected COSATU which has confidently supported Zuma.
The trade unions have protested their increasing marginalization within the Alliance, which is why Zuma, who has cultivated the image of popular champion of the oppressed and victim of a conspiracy by reactionary forces, has assumed a very powerful political role. He has capitalized on Mbeki's authoritarian style of leadership and growing resentment against his 'top-down' politics, parading a charm and openness which were hallmarks of his diplomatic negotiations during the peace process in Burundi (Southall et al. 2006, pp. 222-3 ). Zuma's claim to the presidency remains a central feature of current politics in South Africa and has already attracted warnings of political and economic instability and the spectre that '[a]s in presentday Zimbabwe, the divorce between labour and the liberation movement might result in something much more ambiguous -and much more messy' (Southall et al. 2006, p. 226) .
In , the editor of the Financial Mail, Barney Mthombothi, was scathing in his denunciation of Zuma: 'We've certainly come to a sorry pass indeed when rape and corruption charges ... can propel an old-school tribalist with primitive views on sex, gays and women to the highest office in the land' (Mthombothi 2006, p. 8) . And Farouk Chothia, writing in the BBC Focus on Africa, also in 2006, lamented that the Zuma affair signified the ANC's embrace of the 'siege mentality of its exiled wing' and criticized the Mbeki administration of stripping the party's 'grassroots members of their prerogative to nominate provincial premiers ... and city and town mayors'. Moreover, he recalled Zuma's infamous remark that South Africa's constitution was not 'above' the ANC, thus, in his view, failing 'to distinguish between loyalty to the party and the country; between a multiparty democracy and a one-party state' (Chothia 2006, p. 14) .
Rian Malan, author of My Traitor's Heart (1990), in a polemic in The Spectator goes even further, claiming that the prospect of a Zuma presidency symbolizes South Africa's 'inexorable decline into disorder, political corruption and maladministration'. Worst of all, he draws a dark picture of increasing racialization in society:
Whites are finished ... one in six of us has left since the ANC took over, and those who remain know their place. For apartheid-era law and order minister Adriaan Vlok, this turned out to be on his knees, washing the feet of those he sinned against during the struggle. (Malan 2006, pp. 14-15) The vice chancellor of the University of Cape Town, Njabulo Ndebele, delivering the inaugural King Moshoeshoe Memorial Lecture at the University of the Free State, also expressed concern about the political leadership of South Africa. Like others, he observed the rampant centralization of power, the collapse of ANC party structures and the devolved autonomy which he argued is vital to sustainable governance. He also asked if the present political crisis was the result of not being able to deal with 'the notion of opposition'. He warned that '[a]ny political movement that imagines itself as a perpetual entity should look at the compelling evidence of history', which is why the ANC needs to adopt a greater elasticity in how it deals with internal rupture. The difference between the negotiations of the 1990s and the prevailing crisis, in his view, is that the black majority has to face itself for the first time. 'Could we apply to ourselves the same degree of inventiveness and rigorous negotiation we displayed leading up to the adoption of our Constitution?', he asked (Ndebele 2006) .
Another of the main concerns of our democratic era is the land question. Change has been extremely slow. A recent study regards this as a blot on the achievements of South Africa's democracy and avers that a 'fundamental issue facing policy makers ... is the role of land in poverty eradication' (Hall and Ntsebeza 2007, p. 4) . Land is a basic source of livelihood for the majority who depend on it for agriculture, housing, tourism, mining and industry, which makes the land question a 'critical social question' (Hall and Ntsebeza 2007, p. 6) . Little progress has been made in the implementation of large-scale land reform, despite the ambitious programme initiated by the ANC government after 1994. This lack of achievement ultimately led to the historic Land Summit held in Johannesburg in July 2005, which focused on 'a partnership to fast track land reform' and promised a 'new trajectory forward to 2014', the year set by the ANC government for the redistribution of 30% of whiteowned farmland to Africans. By 2005 only 3% of agricultural land had been transferred (Hall and Ntsebeza 2007, p. 15) .
The editors of The Land Question in South Africa (2007) are pessimistic about the achievements of the summit, which they judged 'illustrated the lack of coherent alternatives and resulted in a debate that runs the risk of being technicist, as stakeholders debate the merits of individual policy mechanisms such as expropriation, compensation, land taxes ... rather than focusing on the land question as a whole' (Ntsebeza and Hall 2007, p. 17) . Cherryl Walker therefore proposes a propoor programme that concentrates on proactive land acquisition by the state to meet the needs of the landless (Walker 2007, pp. 132-51) . This follows her critical view of the disarray and lack of delivery in land restitution aired in 2006 (Walker 2006, pp. 67-92) .
In similar vein, the editors of Democracy and Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa (2006) assess the dire housing shortages, inequities in municipal expenditure, struggles against old apartheid local government structures and high unemployment in South Africa's major cities, despite the original good intentions of the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) inaugurated in 1994 . Important legislation was enacted between 1998 and 2004 which has altered local government profoundly, from the Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998) to the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act (No. 6 of 2004). At the time of the 2004 local elections, therefore, municipalities were eager to provide free basic services. And the first 12 or 13 years of democracy in South Africa have seen the creation of 'integrated and developmental local government; mass delivery of housing and services; a finely crafted array of capital and operating subsidies for delivery to low-income households; and a number of programmes intended to enhance the capacity of local government to undertake delivery' (Pillay et al. 2006, pp. 310-11) . But, as observed in other contexts, urban reform has been very uneven, especially since city government has depended on national interest and financial sustainability.
In addition to issues relating to land restitution, the TRC and ANC politicsboth national and local, the democratic era has highlighted the importance of identity. The retreat into ethnicity has become particularly pronounced in the wake of the Zuma trial, but there has also been a recovery of 'whiteness' since 2000 as Afrikaners, for instance, have marshalled themselves against the racial politics of the ANC in its affirmative action and black empowerment agendas. Hermann Giliomee, perhaps more than anyone, has given an intellectual foundation to a resurgent white Afrikaner identity, ostensibly around language, but bordering on a recall of apartheid power, or -given his neo-liberal credentials -at least a sense of mourning at its passing (Giliomee 2003 , Furlong 2003 . Others have also observed the reinvestment in identity politics, not least among Coloureds in the Western Cape, who now feel themselves to be 'not black enough' (Adhikari 2004) .
Most of all, South Africa's democratic achievements have been marred by the cavalier policies of the Ministry of Health, beginning with Nkosasana Zuma in the Mandela government but more acutely under her successor, Manto Tshabalala Msimang, whose HIV/AIDS management has attracted ridicule and disbelief both nationally and internationally. At the end of 2004, only half the targeted people living with HIV/AIDS were receiving anti-retroviral treatment (ART), despite the investment in 129 state health facilities for this purpose (Hemson and O'Donovan 2006, p. 34) . The crisis in the health sector is acknowledged by even the most sanguine commentators who hope that the National Health Act of 2005 will eventually create a 'sense of coherence and an equity orientation in South Africa's health system'. They admit, however, that the 'question remains whether the national Ministry/Department of Health has sufficient legitimacy' (Schneider et al. 2007, pp. 306-7) .
The picture is much bleaker in any assessment of public hospitals. Researchers report 'managerial paralysis and disempowerment', 'dysfunctional structures', 'work overload', 'physical and psychological stress' and 'clinical failure caused by understaffing'. Added to this are under-funding and the 'policy juggernaut' imposed on hospitals by government. Linked to these woes is the decline in academic medicine which is 'the back-bone of any successful health-care system'. Clinical research has dropped dramatically for various reasons, not least of all the lack of government-sponsored clinical research posts in teaching hospitals and adequate financial resources, not to mention the 'ever-increasing numbers of patients at our tertiary hospitals and the shortage of doctors working there' (von Holdt and Murphy 2007, pp. 336-39) . Ralph Kirsch of the University of Cape Town's Medical School has suggested 'a business-led research-friendly funding model' as a way of reinvigorating academic medicine in South Africa -ironically an international research leader in the apartheid era (Ntyintyane 2006, p. 20) .
The change of note from celebration to censure that has followed the tenth anniversary of South Africa's democracy is also the result of unbridled crime in South Africa which is symbolized by the allegations of police complicity, even to the highest echelons, including the commissioner, Jackie Selebi, following the mysterious death of businessman Brett Kebble in 2005. The statistics of wanton murder, armed robbery and widespread lawlessness have created a sense of panic in many communities, both black and white, who see their hard-won freedoms held to ransom by criminals. André Brink, well-known novelist and academic, is only one outspoken critic of the excessive endemic violence and the government's ineptitude in putting a stop to it. He particularly objected to fumbling attempts to cover-up levels of crime to improve South Africa's image with a view to the 2010 World Cup soccer event. He was incensed by the Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula's insult about 'whingeing whites' creating the crime bogey. He set off a controversy by calling Nqakula, Zuma and Tshabalala-Msimang 'monsters' in an article published by the French newspaper Le Monde of 15 September 2006. Brink criticized the South African ambassador to France, Nomasonto Sibanda-Thusi, of trying to whitewash South Africa's unacceptable levels of violent crime and warned of the 'death of democracy' if 'top government officials accompany a convicted criminal like Tony Yengeni to prison and treat him like a hero ... [and] others simply turn a blind eye. Staying silent in our young democracy is one of the surest ways of ensuring its terrible demise' (Brink 2006, p. 20) .
The unfinished business of the TRC was a recurring theme in reflections on the tenth anniversary of its inauguration in 2006. As Anthony Egan (2007, p. 455) puts it: 'Though the TRC opened up many memories of atrocity and trauma, it did little to heal and learn from such memories.' Social scientists and political commentators have recently shown less interest in the TRC or its legacy; a clutch of publications by leading researchers barely mention the Commission (cf. Buhlungu et al. 2006 , Calland 2006 . This is curious in view of its high profile in the late 1990s. It appears that once the final report was published, the TRC was already dead. Its shocking disclosures, record of human rights violations, narratives of political crimes and archive of apartheid rule went silent, or were silenced. The silence, however, weighs on South African society. The past continues to infiltrate our democratic present mainly because there is a palpable reluctance on the part of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to prosecute and further possibility of amnesty for offenders.
'In the context of the TRC', Charles Villa-Vicencio, former TRC commissioner and now executive director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, argues that: the need for prosecutions and related hearings is primarily about the disclosure of the truth ... Justice (however compromised) needs to be given a public face in order to bring a measure of closure to the past, and to be the kind of deterrent needed. (Villa-Vicencio 2006, p.19) Prosecutions are only one part of the TRC's unfinished work; reparations are the other, perhaps even more important, part. After a five-year delay, the government made a paltry payment of R30,000 to victims identified by the TRC. This presumably signals closure as far as the state is concerned. Community reparations, however, have hardly been addressed. Increased social services are not enough. The lingering memories of the Cradock Four, the Pebco Three, the Motherwell Bomb, the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands War and the Soweto Uprising, to name but a few cataclysmic events, have not been expunged through proper memorialization, community projects, oral histories or social improvement schemes. Since these are expensive initiatives, the democratic government seems reluctant to bear the costs. That human rights atrocities go unchecked in prosecutions and unrecompensed in reparations, however, allows a pattern of political authoritarianism to persist. Both P.W. Botha and Augusto Pinochet have gone to their graves defiant and unpunished. Villa-Vicencio (2006, p. 19) thinks it is time 'to clear our books, or the pressure of the past will continue to build'.
David Thelen (2002, p. 165) has criticized the Commission itself, arguing that '[b]y adopting the framework of freezing, confining and explaining experience, the TRC severely eroded its capacity to promote its own agenda of advancing democracy'. He believes that its preoccupation to document gross human rights violations under apartheid resulted in a process intent on archiving evidence and writing a report, thus constructing a narrative of apartheid oppression, rather than recovering and airing personal experiences. This underlying positivist intention has therefore limited the usefulness of the stories of suffering that were recounted at the TRC hearings, thus consigning singular experiences to a public repository and submerging individuals in collectivities. The act of institutionalizing the TRC was ironically its undoing; it simply became an extension of the state, thus losing any semblance of independence or autonomy. It became a bank of memory offering only a tiny dividend; the huge personal investment in political transformation through agonized testimony sank into a low-yield government archive. Thelen goes on to develop a thesis that the TRC hearings 'invite us to shift our starting point for studying agency and causation from collectivities, circumstances and institutions to individuals' (Thelen 2002, pp. 167-90) . This is a different perspective from Villa-Vicencio's injuction to 'clear the books' which is predicated upon the acknowledgment of collective [white] guilt and the need for group repentance, as well as a national narrative of apartheid atrocities. It also links up with post-colonial writing on remembering and forgetting. Johannes Fabian (2006, p. 146) , for example, explains that forgetfulness often implies 'intellectual failure, damage done to reason, which in the end deprives us of the possibility to pull ourselves out of the morass of the colonial past'.
To leave the economy to last is possibly perverse, but it is perhaps the aspect of South Africa's democracy that has been most celebrated. Trevor Manuel, the Minister of Finance, is revered by big business and until the Polokwane ANC conference in December 2007 was a leading member of the ANC's NEC (Cameron 2006) . South Africans have generally regarded the economy as well-run since 1994, notwithstanding fierce attacks on the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (introduced in 1996) by trade unions and the SACP, which are emblematic of the ideological rivalries within the Alliance partnership after the abandonment of the more collectivist Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the Mandela era (Butler 2007, p. 44) . There is a paradox here. Manuel is fêted abroad, enjoys the approval of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, consorts, like Mbeki, with leaders of the G8, and has his finger on the pulse of Western finance.
But, as Eve Bertelsen (1998, p. 239) has argued, the idea of democracy (political equality) has been 'incorporated and disarmed' through its coupling with liberalism (individual freedoms and defence of private property). The inherent radicalism of democratic struggle has therefore been blunted by the market's energetic support of liberalism, thus undermining democracy as 'a radical and participatory social force'. This has meant economic prosperity for the middle classes, but little material improvement in the conditions of the poor. Poverty remains the biggest test of South Africa's democratic revolution. To date, it has failed. For this reason, the political left demands the abandonment of GEAR.
The ANC's performance in managing the economy has to be seen against the legacy of apartheid rule which bled South Africa in an era of sanctions and political isolation. According to the Department of Trade and Industry:
The period since 1994 has seen the South African economy undergo profound restructuring. Ten years of consistent economic growth has been recorded. Macroeconomic stabilization has largely been achieved, providing a platform for accelerating the growth rate. The economy has become increasingly integrated into global markets and has become a successful exporter of manufactured goods and valueadded services. South Africa is now able to position itself as an advanced manufacturing economy. (cited in Eidelberg 2004, p. 244) Some economists endorse such a view, others regard South Africa's relative prosperity as simply the consequence of a buoyant global economy and not especially the result of the ANC's economic policies, and on the political right yet others allege that South Africa's economy is actually in decline. Stuart Jones et al. (2002) , among the latter, point to the poor performance of the mining sector after the 1970s, especially gold whose output has declined by half, thus dramatically reducing South Africa's share of Western capitalism's total production. Paradoxically, however, mining still remains the lodestar of the country's economy, which therefore compounds its vulnerability to international finance. In Eidelberg's (2004, pp. 247-48) review of the economy, he also argues that the manufacturing sector has been unable to stem the decline caused by the production of minerals. He cites various reasons, including the large-scale importation of goods, the lack of skilled labour, and an insufficiently developed internal market. He goes on to examine the motor industry in particular, which is often hailed as a success story, drawing on the persuasive research of David Kaplan (2003) from the left, which is sceptical about the future prospects of manufacturing, mainly on account of its relatively low growth during the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Although Stuart's and Kaplan's contrasting studies deal mainly with the period up to the Mbeki era, Eidelberg (2004, p. 253) extends his arguments into the new millennium to build his own thesis that continuity between the late-apartheid and democratic economies is more discernible than any historical break.
He is not alone in devising such teleology. Southall (2007, pp. 201-21 ) adopts a similar position in his examination of South African parastatals. His particular casestudies in the era of ANC rule are Transnet, South African Airways, Eskom and Denel, and he pays particular attention to the appointment of Maria Ramos as CEO of Transnet. He demonstrates that these state-owned enterprises have been useful 'instruments for extending black control over the economy, increasing opportunities for an expanding black middle class, and for promoting black empowerment', as they had been in gaining economic power for Afrikaners after 1948. In this way, the ANC government has recognized the parastatals as 'occupying strategic sites in the economy' (Southall 2007, p. 222) .
Southall agrees with Eidelberg that mining and manufacturing are in decline, despite the fact that they have -with finance -been the target of the government's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy. In this sense, the parastatals are still being used, as they were under apartheid governments, to service the needs of the minerals and energy complex. On the question of continuity, he regards the ANC government's policy as equally disastrous to the South African economy as the industrial strategy pursued by the National Party, which was to privatize state-owned enterprises before liberalizing the market. Privatized monopolies therefore continue to dominate the economy as they have for decades (Southall 2007, p. 223) .
The 2004 after-party has not been as joyous as the tenth-anniversary bash. No sooner had the celebrations ended than the democratic honeymoon was over. The troublesome political issues which dominated politics between 1994 and 2004, have since been eclipsed by spiralling problems, mainly around presidential succession and the current crisis of power in the ANC; a dysfunctional health ministry; lack of progress in land redistribution; rampant corruption in public and corporate life; rising violent crime; increasing racialization in society; and shibboleths of the economy. These are certainly elite concerns, mainly the product of academic reflection, which will doubtless invite robust rebuttal from other quarters. But it is conceivable that any counter-view, perhaps from the vantage point of the economically disempowered or grassroots interests, though producing a different hierarchy of concerns, is unlikely necessarily to produce a more optimistic analysis of the state of South Africa's democracy in 2008. Poverty still wracks the country, leaving fractured communities unable to properly participate in the democratic process or enjoy its rationed fruits, and therefore indifferent to its principles or prospects and uncommitted to its maintenance or expansion.
